INDIA IN GREECE

by
E. POCOCKE

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Hellenic or Oriental streams. A notable example of the singular variety of these forms, will be found under the name Budha.

It is evident that two classes of literature must now be studied in connection with ancient Greece. First,—The *Mythology* of Greece, showing what Greeks thought and wrote in connection with their divinities, and the immense mass of legend in juxtaposition with them. Secondly,—The *History*, which at present lies buried beneath this mythology; which, as forming the very earliest records of Hellas, must be studied like any other portion of established history.

Henceforward, let us not, succumbing to an easy indolence, deny on *theoretical grounds* the existence of those truths which *Geography* has restored to *History*.

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I here take the opportunity of observing, that one of the heroes just noticed will be found to be not only an Indian chieftain, but one of the Grecian gods.

Speaking of the worship of arms by the military race, Colonel Tod observes, "The devotion of the Rajpoot is still paid to his arms and to his horse. He swears 'by the steel,' and prostrates himself before his defensive buckler, his lance, his sword, or his dagger. The worship of the sword in the Acropolis of Athens by the Getic Attila, with all the accompaniments of pomp and place, forms an admirable episode in the history of the decline and fall of Rome; and had Gibbon witnessed the worship of the double-edged sword,[1] by the Prince of Méwar, and all his chivalry, the historian might even have embellished his animated account of the adoration of the scymitar, the symbol of Mars."

Such were the warlike tribes, "the Children of the Sun," that first peopled the land of Hellas. If the reader will now refer to the double map of the old and the new settlements of the sons of Hellen, he will distinctly see a system of colonisation corresponding to the various provinces in the parent country of the emigrants. Bordering on the Eubœan sea, he will discern the "LOCRI." These are the inhabitants of LOGURH, a district of considerable extent in Affghanistan, south of the city of Cabool. "It extends up the northern slope of the high land of Ghuznee; and, as its elevation in all parts exceeds six thousand feet, the climate is very severe in winter. The Logurh River, with its various feeders, intersects and drains this district, which, being well watered, fertile, and cultivated with much care, is one of the most productive parts of the country.[2] Adjoining the small

Scythic valour: "There were no equestrian feats, no distant fighting with darts, but each fought as if victory depended on his sole arm." They fought the Greeks hand to hand."—Rajast., vol. i. p. 69.

[1] Khanda.

[2] Lat. 34° 20′, long. 69°.

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the battle, between Porus and Alexander, is generally placed at Julalpoor."[1]

It is impossible not to be struck with the singular similarity of the tract of country both old and new; the land which these martial emigrants left and that on which they entered. Both richly watered with numerous streams, and both extremely fruitful. The Wulur, or the "Great Lake," in the parent country, the Lake Copias in the land of Hellas, the Kshetriya or warrior caste, in either region of the world, complete the harmonious landscape of antiquity; and this singular identity of taste, as well as of locality, I shall again have occasion to notice. As in the lands of the far-off Sinde, so in their new settlements, the ingenious and lively people of Attica are found close neighbours to the Bœotians. What a vivid picture does this fact convey of the steadiness of the progress, and compactness of the array which brought these martial bands of the HELAS to their final settlement in Greece, the land of their adoption! How truly did they exchange one land of mountain and of flood, for another almost its exact counterpart! How powerful and resistless must have been their progress, that they should arrive at their destined home, in such unbroken order!

[1] Thornton, Punj., vol. i., p. 290.

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VIII.

THE NORTHERN TRIBES.

"Je sais bien qu'il existe toujours cont.. cette histoire une motive de défiance, parce qu'elle ne possède aucune garantie de sa véracité fournie par nos écrivains d'occident. Étrange condition de l'Inde! Tout indique qu'elle a été riche, et par conséquent civilisée, de bonne heure. De temps immémoriaux, les sages, les marchands, et les conquérants ont dirigés leurs pas vers cette contrée qui remuait tant de passions diverses, ils en ont rapportés, les uns des systèmes de philosophie, les autres de riches trésors, et les derniers quelques lauriers, achetés chèrement. Aucun d'eux n'est deigné nous transmettre des détails authentiques sur un pays dont ils convoitaient la sagesse, et l'opulence."

LANGLOIS, *Pref. to Harivansa.*

WE have now seen in the Indian tribes of the LOGURH, the ATTAC, the BAIHOOT, MAGAR, COR-INDUS, ARGHWALAS, SARAWAN, LES-POI, AKKAIHU, LOGURH-OOKSHWALŒ—the parent states of the LOCRI, ATTICA, BŒOTIA, MEGARIS, CORINTHUS, ARGOLIS, settlers on the SARONIC, LESBOI, ACHAIANS, and LOCRI-OZOLŒ. I shall now proceed to fill up in some slight degree this general outline of a great historico-geographic fact. At the same time, it must be borne in mind as a principle, that we by no means get the true original orthography of the names of places which occur at this day in Afghanistan; for disguised under modern forms, the old Hindoo names in many cases, still subsist, as I shall shortly show, and this principle applies both to Greece and Persia; still, they are not unfrequently so distinctly noted, as to present to the acute observer, historical facts of great importance.

TAULANTII, BULLINÍ, CHAONIA.

With this group situated in North Western Epirus, I propose to continue the examination of the political element which constituted primitive Hellas. The convictions arising from these, and other apparently detached members of the Grecian aggregate, will be found even more powerful than those produced by the larger masses whom we have accompanied to the second land of the HELAS.

"BULLINI"[1] is the Greek form of writing "BOLANI," or "The People of the BOLAN." The Bolan pass is situated in Beloochistan, on the great route from Northern Sinde, by Shikarpoor and Dadur, to Kandahar and Ghuznee. "It is not so much a pass over a lofty range, as a continuous succession of ravines and gorges, commencing near Dadur, and first winding among the subordinate ridges, stretching eastward from the Hala chain of mountains, the brow of which it finally cross-cuts, and thus gives access from the vast plains of Hindostan, to the elevated and uneven tract, extending from the Hindoo Koosh to the vicinity of the Indian Ocean. Its commencement on the eastern side, from the plain of Cutch Gundava, is about five miles north-west of Dadur;[2] the elevation of the entrance being about eight hundred feet above the level of the sea. The valley through which the road runs, is here about half a mile wide; the enclosing hills, five hundred or six hundred feet high, consist of coarse conglomerate. The road ascends along the course of a river, called among the mountains the Bolan, or Kouhee. The river in this part of the pass, varies in depth from a few inches to about two feet, and in the first five miles of the road is crossed eight times. At Kundye, or as it is sometimes called, Kondilan, six miles from the entrance, the pass again

[1] See Append. Rule xviii.

[2] Lat. 29° 30′, long. 67° 40.

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XV.

THE PROMISED LAND.

"Who smote great nations and slew mighty kings. Sihon, king of the Amorites, and Og, king of Bashan, and all the kingdoms of Canaan. And gave their land for an heritage unto Israel, his people."—Ps. cxxxv. 10—12.

It is with a profound feeling of gratitude to the Great Author of Truth, that I approach this sacred subject. Whatever light I may throw upon the momentous theme, I would in all humility ascribe to the only source of light, and thankfully preface my remarks with that "Laus Deo," which characterised the conclusions of the literary labours of our forefathers.

The marvellous history of that people who were hallowed by the blessing of Jehovah for the holy work of regenerating the human race, is perhaps the grandest monument of Divine compassion and justice, in connexion with any single nation upon earth. The land which was "flowing with milk and honey," a "land of vineyards and olives," was an especial inheritance, granted for an especial act of faith, to the descendants of the Father of the Faithful.

But it would have been utterly impossible for the children of the great Patriarch, to realise this rich token of Almighty benevolence, had not the same Gracious Being who had "caused the lines to fall to them in pleasant places," vouchsafed the might of *His* arm to dispossess the warlike tribes which had secure possession of this fertile territory at the period of their entrance upon it.

The long slavery of His chosen people in Egypt, was closed by a miracle as striking as the providence which had introduced Joseph its youthful ruler. A dynasty which "knew nöt Joseph," had taken possession of the Egyptian throne, and the bondage of the Hebrews had become bitter and constant. The ambition which prompted the Solar Race to attempt, in spite of the intentions of Providence, an eternity of existence for the body, induced the same people to rear grand and gigantic structures to ensure a perpetuity of renown.

Works such as these could not possibly have been constructed in those early times without a body of men urged on to the task by princes, who moved a large portion of their subjects as a gigantic living machinery, uniform in its action, having no volition, and set in motion by the vapour of a Despot's ambition. By such means were constructed the grand aqueducts of Rome —her highways, and the pyramids of Egypt. The rearing of these last named gigantic masses of masonry had pressed heavily upon the strength of the Hebrews. The misery of their existence is forcibly depicted in the sacred writings. At length the day of deliverance dawned. By the special intervention of the Almighty, they were enabled to depart from that land, which to this day bears the traces of their forced slavery. But such valuable auxiliaries could not be tamely resigned by a warlike people; who while they scorned the arts of peace themselves, found it indispensable to maintain around them a large body of slaves to aid them in the objects of their ambition. The pursuit of the Hebrews was resolved upon, and hastily put into execution. Already the martial bands of these Solar Rajpoots were upon their track, and the advance of the fugitives seemed completely barred by the arm of the sea which rolled directly in their front. It was at this critical moment that the cavalry and

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